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1 Introduction
This article looks at women’s presence in local
government (LG) in Pakistan with a particular
focus on the period of the Musharraf regime’s
‘Devolution of Power Plan’ (2000).1 In 2000, one
of the most significant forms of affirmative action
was introduced embodied in a quota setting 33
per cent of the seats for women in local
government. While an important achievement for
advancing women’s representation in political
office, this article cautions against interpreting
the quota or its implementation as a sign of a
more democratic government. I argue that the
quota for women was supported by a military
regime, while some other civilian regimes were
reluctant to support it but instead supported
wide-sweeping progressive reforms in other
spheres. Establishing direct correlations between
leadership support for a women’s quota and
regime type is highly problematic. An
examination of the Pakistani governments’
engagement with women’s quotas suggests criss-
cross patterns which are often informed by
political pragmatism on the one hand and by
ideological continuities on the other. The
following section gives a brief overview of the
political function and weight of local government
across different historical phases; this is followed
by a more in-depth examination of the different
regimes’ engagement with the question of quotas,
and how they fit (if at all) within the wider
social/political and gender policies pursued. The
contentious role played by NGOs and the
women’s movement in mediating with different
regimes to secure women’s rights is discussed at
length, followed by conclusions.
2 Historical overview
Local government (LG) is a critical locale for
change in Pakistan. It was mentioned in the
Muslim League Manifesto even before Pakistan’s
creation; and has been a part of various
constitutions (1962, 1973). Three military
dictators instituted LG reform as a means of
ensuring control: General Ayub Khan (1958–69),
General Zia-ul-Haq (1977–88) and General
Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008). But, LG was not
in the limelight during the periods of civilian
government: the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)
(Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) (1972–7); PPP (Benazir
Bhutto) (1988–90 and 1993–6); and the Pakistan
Muslim League (PML) (Nawaz Sharif) (1990–3
and 1997–9). However, the 1973 constitution,
introduced by the PPP government of Zulfiqar
Bhutto, which is still operative, includes LG as a
non-binding issue in the section entitled,
‘Principles of Policy.’ The following two articles
set out the government’s position on LG:
52
Women in Local Government: The
Pakistan Experience
Saba Gul Khattak*
Abstract This article looks at women’s representation in local government in Pakistan, focusing particularly
on the introduction of a quota setting 33 per cent of the seats for women brought in under General
Musharraf’s Devolution of Power Plan in 2000. The article suggests that establishing a direct correlation
between a woman’s quota and regime type is problematic. It demonstrates a complex pattern of interaction
on the issue by both the military and civilian regimes in Pakistan. Policies which have been brought in,
informed both by political pragmatism and ideological continuity, have been wide ranging and almost
contradictory in nature. The article also highlights the importance of the roles of NGOs and women activists
in providing capacity building and support for mobilising women both as candidates and as voters. It shows
that women’s struggles at grassroots can bring achievements even in spaces where patriarchal norms rule,
but these pathways to political empowerment are uneven and unpredictable.
IDS Bulletin Volume 41  Number 5  September 2010   © 2010 The Author. Journal compilation © Institute of Development Studies
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
Article 32. The State shall encourage local
Government institutions composed of elected
representatives of the areas concerned and in
such institutions special representations will
be given to peasants, workers and women.
Article 37(i). The State shall:
(i) Decentralise the government administration
so as to facilitate expeditious disposal of its
business to meet the convenience and
requirements of the public.
(Government of Pakistan 1973)
These principles of policy remained only on paper
until LG was activated under the military rules of
General Zia-ul-Haq and General Musharraf. The
LG system allows for representation at the local
level and addresses basic municipal functions
such as water and sanitation, roads and building,
agricultural extension services, community
development, and basic health and education
delivery. This makes the system popular with
authoritarian regimes, as it allows people to be
involved in local decision-making and grassroots
democratic processes while centralised
authoritarian rule can continue.
The three-tiered LG system (Union Council at
the village/ward level, Tehsil Council at the sub-
district level and District Council) began with
General Ayub Khan’s basic democracy through
‘basic democrats’. LG was then ignored between
1968 and 1977, but revived by General Zia-ul-Haq
in 1979 through provincial ordinances. LG
elections were held in 1979, 1983 and 1987 on a
non-party basis to ensure support and popularity
for the military regime. During the following
decade-long civilian democratic rule (1988–99)
the LG system became an ‘on-again, off-again’
phenomenon as each government attempted to
garner political support by (re)instituting or
undoing the LG system. Although LG elections
were held across the country in the first tenure of
Nawaz Sharif, in his second term, they were only
held in Punjab and Balochistan. As women’s
quotas were left to provincial governments’
discretion, they varied widely between 2 and 25
per cent. LG became barely functional. In 2000,
the Musharraf government announced its
‘Devolution of Power’ programme through the
promulgation of the Local Government
Ordinance (LGO) 2000 at the federal level. It
introduced administrative and fiscal change for
LG,2 as districts could decide their own budget
and spend. Under this new ordinance, local
government elections were held in 2001 and 2006.
For the first time in Pakistan’s history, the LGO
of 2000 provided 33 per cent of the seats for
women in all three tiers of LG across the four
provinces. These seats were directly elected at
village level for Union Councils and indirectly
elected at district and sub-district levels for
District and Tehsil councils (Yazdani 2003). This
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Table 1 Comparative position of women’s seats during LG elections 2001 and 2005
Category of seat LG election 2000–1 LG election 2005
Total No. of available seats 36,066 24,463
Nominations filed 61,411 (1.7/seat) 57,275 (2.3/seat)
Percentage 170% 234%
Rejection/withdrawal 13,566 9,853
Percentage 37% 40%
Contesting candidates 47,845 (1.3/seat) 47,422 (1.9/seat)
Percentage 133% 194%
Unopposed seats 9,007 4,089
Percentage 25% 16.80%
Vacant seats 4,077 742
Percentage 11.3% 3%
Source National Reconstruction Bureau (2006).
saw the entry of approximately 36,000 women
into local government structures and initiated
the process of mainstreaming them in the
political arena. For the second round of elections,
the government reduced the number of seats at
the council level but was forced to keep the
women’s quota at 33 per cent amidst protests
from women councillors and NGOs. The overall
reduction in seats resulted in fewer women
entering the political scene, but by 2005, more
women had mobilised and were contesting the
general seats indicating a desire to preserve the
gains made over the last two zigzag decades.
As can be seen from Table 1, even though seats
were reduced for the 2005 election, a greater
percentage of women filed nominations and
contested it compared with 2001. There were
also fewer vacant seats, especially in Balochistan
and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) at the
Tehsil and District Council levels and in Punjab
and NWFP at the Union Council level, as women
realised that there were gains to be made from
becoming representatives.
3 Military and civilian governments, political
parties and women’s political representation
Women’s political representation has been a
contested domain. The demands for women’s
inclusion in the political sphere date back to the
inception of Pakistan and the allocation of 3 per
cent of seats to women in assemblies. Although
General Ayub Khan championed women’s rights,
he also tried to prevent Fatima Jinnah from
contesting elections against him by questioning
women’s fundamental ability to rule the country.
General Zia also wanted to prevent Benazir
Bhutto from assuming political power, but he
still provided a small quota for women at the LG
and later federal levels.
There have been differences between the federal
and provincial government positions on the
modalities for implementing women’s quotas.
This is primarily because local government has
been on the ‘concurrent list’, meaning that it can
be under federal government as well as
provincial government purview.
While there is no bar on women from
participating in the formulation of different
policies, there are no specific mechanisms to
include their presence in policymaking. After
LGO 2000, the reservation of seats for women in
the national and provincial assemblies was 17
per cent, and after the 2002 national elections,
there were 74 women in the national assembly. A
total of 14 of these came through general seats
and the others on reserved seats. There were
also 143 women members of provincial
assemblies, of whom 15 came through direct
elections and 128 via reserved seats.
After the 2001 LG election, the Women’s
Ministry (with assistance from UNDP) launched
the ‘Women’s Political Participation Project’
(W3P) to help the large number of newly elected
women legislators in performing their jobs; and
the ‘Women’s Political School’ to train women
councillors about their roles, powers and
responsibilities in local government.
Although the Women’s Ministry has played a
proactive role in pushing women’s effective
presence in representative government at all
levels, it has not always been favourable. The
state has usually taken a patronising approach
towards women, and most state institutions have
dealt with women (as elsewhere in the world) in
a welfare context. Women were seldom treated
as individuals with political and economic
entitlements. The official discourse on women’s
political rights, although present from the
beginning in terms of lip service, has undergone
extremely slow change. This is because attitudes
within government, for multiple reasons, have
been slow to recognise the urgency of
mainstreaming women. The recommendations of
various Commissions on the Status of women
demonstrate this well.
Even though Zia-ul-Haq’s government
established a Commission on the Status of
Women (1984) on the recommendations of the
Women’s Rights Committee (1976), the
Commission’s recommendations were ignored.
This Commission recommended political parties
to give 20 per cent of women members party
tickets to contest elections. Another Commission
on the Status of Women (1994–97) established by
the PPP government to look into the repeal of
the discriminatory Hudood Ordinances,
recommended 33 per cent quotas at the local and
national level through direct election and joint
electorate. Again, this was ignored by the Nawaz
Sharif government that took power in 1997.
However, by the time the Permanent
Commission on the Status of Women was
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established by the Musharraf regime in 2000,
substantive advocacy on reservation for women
in politics resulted in a 33 per cent quota for
women at the LG level.
Although women’s presence in legislatures at the
national, provincial and district levels has
become more pronounced, reservations have
elicited disdain and contempt among some
government representatives. According to The
Aurat Foundation Citizens’ Report (n.d.: 3) one
Minister for Local Government reportedly said:
Bibi, you don’t know the situation on the
ground. We are political people and we know
the reality. If you reserve 33 per cent seats for
women, you will find that very few genuine
women will come forward willingly to contest
these seats. In fact, you will find mostly
servant girls and harlots will be brought
forward by men to occupy the reserved seats.
Male politicians and government representatives
commonly dismissed the idea of direct elections
for women’s reserved seats as being unrealistic in
Pakistan’s social conditions. They contended that
‘there are no women out there’.
Although there has been a gradual overall
increase in support to women from the
government, this support was ambivalent during
the 1990s when parliamentary democracy in
Pakistan was precariously balanced between the
two arch-rivals, the PPP and PML. However,
during this decade, NGOs with different roles
created spaces for women in the political arena
by undertaking voter and candidate
education/training programmes; lobbying parties
for gender sensitive manifestos; and demanding
that they practice affirmative action measures to
enable women to enter the political arena,
echoing the demands of the 1984 Report of the
Commission on the Status of Women.
The exact arrangements for quotas – whether
these should be on a party or non-party basis,
through direct or indirect election, the
percentage and constituencies to be covered –
were debated extensively throughout the 1990s.
However, each elected government wanted to
manipulate the arrangement such that the
benefits would only accrue to the ruling party.
Since each government had only a tiny edge over
the opposition, none had enough support to
ensure this, and quota arrangements remained
unresolved. The last Sharif government defeated
a private member’s Bill for the restoration of
lapsed parliamentary seats for women in May
1997, saying that the 20 reserved seats for
women were to be part of a ‘constitutional
reform package’ to be presented ‘soon’. The
package was never presented, nor were its
contents shared with the public (Amnesty
International 2008).
The deadlock at the national and provincial
levels was not reflected at the LG level where the
Sharif government managed to increase women’s
presence in three out of four provinces. While
this government was not known for progressive
views on women’s rights, it favoured LG elections
in continuity with the Zia regime, which had
spawned the PML, the government’s leading
party. The Zia regime had generated a support
base through political patronage and the PML
government was able to extend this through
Zia’s protégés who were deeply entrenched at
the LG level. Increasing the quota for women’s
representation at the LG level in 1993 at once
demonstrated its supposedly pro-women stance,
while also benefiting its political party interests.
The PPP-led government, meanwhile, constantly
tried to undo the PML’s support base at the LG
level every time it came to power and in turn,
was criticised for adopting an anti-LG stance and
not doing enough for women beyond lip service.
Women’s political representation whether at the
national or the local level was ultimately
secondary to political party interests.
We need to analyse the intricate web of
commonalities between military and civilian
governments. Sometimes, the civilian regimes
reflected continuity of policies with military
regimes and sometimes they became symbols of
ruptures and difference. The Sharif governments
had more in common with the Zia regime than
democratic regimes, e.g. he even tried to
introduce Sharia in 1999. The Bhutto
government, meanwhile, continued the economic
policies of its military predecessor and was unable
to institute reservations or party-based
affirmative action for women despite its secular
and pro-women credentials. Military regimes
have also instituted quotas for women with more
alacrity than civilian governments; however, some
military governments have been more
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misogynistic than others – Zia-ul-Haq’s
Islamisation, for example, denied women their
fundamental right to equality in legal matters
and helped make rape and murder compoundable
private crimes. The Sharif government gave
women quotas in LG but nothing at the national
and provincial levels; Sharif publicly sympathised
with rape survivors and declared gang-rape
punishable through capital punishment, yet he
preserved the Hudood Laws that provided rapists
and honour killers with refuge from the law.
Eventually, Musharraf ’s military regime
defanged the Hudood Ordinances with support
from the PPP in the National Assembly. These
criss-cross patterns are informed by political
pragmatism on the one hand and by ideological
continuities on the other.
4 Governmental policy on women, international
commitments and donor influence
Various policy measures, international
commitments and donor influences, as well as
pressure brought by women’s organisations and
feminist activists have played a role in the
formulation of national policies for women.
CEDAW (Convention for the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women) adopted by the
UN General Assembly in 1979, was considered
too politically sensitive to be discussed during
the reign of General Zia-ul-Haq and was only
ratified in 1995 at the time of the Beijing
Conference on Women. During the 1990s, there
was no clear policy on women, although there
were some pro-women initiatives. The Women’s
Division was upgraded to the status of a Ministry,
but it had a small budget and there were
frequent changes in leadership – the secretary
changed nine times between 1989 and 1993 –
preventing any consistent programme
implementation or planning. The Ministry
worked on producing a draft national policy on
women, but it remained just a draft throughout
the 1990s (Khan 1998: 23).
The National Policy for Empowerment and
Development of Women,3 launched on 8 March
(International Women’s Day) 2000, reflected a
changed government rhetoric. There was a shift
from treating women as welfare recipients in the
1960s, to attempts to enhance their social and
economic status during the 1970s and 1980s, to
the 2000 policy in which empowerment became a
central goal. This empowerment included
politics, and the resulting 33 per cent reservation
at the LG level was a radical step that ushered in
a fundamental change on the gendered political
landscape.
The influence of the government’s international
commitments as well as international donors and
multilateral institutions like the UN on
policymaking in Pakistan is evident in this policy.
For example, the prominent role of the Women’s
Political School funded by the UNDP and other
decentralisation policy support emphasising
‘good governance’, ‘new institutionalism’ and
‘participation of the poor’ provided by the UK’s
Department for International Development
(DFID), the Swiss Development Cooperation
(SDC), and the German foundations, such as
Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, indicate the
influence of donor driven initiatives. 
This can be interpreted in a positive as well as
negative light. In the latter context, it would
imply that the government enjoys little
independence. Many donor-funded reports
demonstrate an instrumentalist approach to
women’s rights, arguing that women’s inclusion
would yield improved development indices
through effective service delivery. These reports
also show scant understanding of the complex
relationship between politics, culture, patriarchy
and state institutions vis-á-vis women’s rights.
They relegate all ills to a retrogressive culture
that together with corruption and poverty
becomes the main barrier to women’s
empowerment. Women are portrayed as poor
and vulnerable, whose rights need to be defended
through external interventions. The mention of
women’s agency and voice is largely absent in
donor literature, although their gains are
mentioned and ascribed to patronage from male
politicians. However, they seldom recognise the
role of patriarchy in state institutions and
consider misogynist social attitudes to be a result
of culture alone. Donor influence is also analysed
in a positive light, as many activists believe that
the LG 33 per cent reservation largely resulted
from the efforts of donors and women activists
nationally and internationally who lobbied their
respective governments to commit to women’s
political empowerment, through instruments
such as CEDAW, the Beijing commitments and
the recommendations of the Women’s
Commissions.
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5 The women’s movement’s role in Pakistan
The women’s movement in Pakistan can be
traced to its pre-independence origins when the
vibrant nationalist movement in India mobilised
many women as active participants in the
struggle against British colonialism. Women’s
concerns in the initial years of Pakistan were
focused on their immediate problem – the
rehabilitation of thousands of displaced women
through voluntary services. This was followed by
the creation of the All Pakistan Women’s
Association (APWA), whose branches were
established in every district by the District
Commissioner’s wife, who had to spearhead it in
cooperation with the local elite who had
supported the creation of Pakistan. Thus, the
formal coming together of the state apparatuses
and women’s issues took place through APWA.
APWA made its demands for women in a welfare
mode throughout the 1950s and 1960s. It raised
the issue of second marriage and demanded
amendments in family laws, especially regarding
the registration of marriage, divorce and
polygamy as well as inheritance for orphans. The
issue of political representation was also raised,
although the constitution had guaranteed some
representation through quotas.
By the end of the 1960s the UN ‘Decade of
Development’ in Pakistan showed disastrous
results: East Pakistan, with the majority of the
population, had broken away due to unequal
divisions of resources and political power. The
process was brutal, as the military attempted to
quell secession. Between 1.5 and 3 million people
were killed and 200,000 women raped in 1970–1
(Khattak 1996). The Progressive Women’s
Organisation protested the rapes but by and large
there was silence from organisations like APWA,
whose members were wives of bureaucrats and
the elite, who had a stake in the Pakistani state.
The 1970s marked the transformation of the
women’s movement. Issues of women’s multiple
roles, oppressions, and exploitation were being
debated internationally, and women were
questioning the structures that rendered them
and their contributions invisible. In Pakistan,
women’s role was changing as the 1973
constitution had given them reserved seats at the
provincial and national level for a period of 15
years and their visibility in the public arena was
increasing under a liberal progressive political
party. A new generation of women after attending
western universities were returning home to
teach or become journalists. These trends were
arrested when the campaign to oust Zulfiqar
Bhutto, couched in religious idiom, was launched
in 1977. Bhutto’s capitulation to the retrogressive
forces and eventual hanging in 1978 heralded a
critical change for women’s rights.
General Zia-ul-Haq took over government
through a military coup in July 1977 and began
the process of ‘Islamisation’ of the country. Many
of the gains that women had made over decades
were reversed. For instance, the founder of
Pakistan, Mr M. Ali Jinnah had stated in a speech
in 1944 that, ‘It is a crime against humanity that
our women are shut up within the four walls of
the house like prisoners’ (Lewis 2001), but this
was exactly what Zia-ul-Haq attempted to do
through his campaign of ‘chador aur chaar deevari’
(veil and the four walls) for women in the 1980s by
making it state policy for women to cover their
heads on television, observe purdah while
attending college, not to participate in sports, etc.
The Women’s Action Forum (WAF) was formed in
1981 to protest against state policies that
sanctioned discrimination through the legal
system and anti-women interpretations of Islam.
Made up largely of upper and middle class
educated urban women in Karachi, Lahore and
Islamabad, WAF has worked as a lobbying group
along the principles of collective leadership and
non-hierarchy.
By the late 1980s, some important developments
had taken place: the Islamisation process had
taken root, extensively funded by the state for
reasons of legitimacy and pragmatism and with
support from foreign countries for the Afghan
Jihad. At the same time, opposition had grown to
the regime’s anti-women and anti-minorities
laws and human rights violations, such as the
introduction of medieval forms of punishment as
well as media censorship. This coalesced in three
forms: the creation of WAF; the creation of
advocacy and development NGOs; and the
coalition between NGO workers, intellectuals
and progressive political parties against military
rule. These developments culminated in the
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy.
The women’s movement took the lead in
demanding not only legal and political reform of
the system in favour of women but also
challenged and exposed the militarisation of the
state and society.
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Throughout the 1990s, women activists
demanded increased political representation and
worked with the government (especially the PPP
government whose leaders it had joined in the
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy) to
outline priorities for women. They debated their
position and status in mainstream politics to
determine whether they should exert influence
from outside or directly through joining
mainstream political parties. For the most part,
they pushed the state and political parties to
create space for them through affirmative action
for women’s representation at all levels of
government and by ensuring a quota for women
within political party structures. These demands
came from the platform of WAF as well as the
NGOs that promoted rights-based approaches to
development. These groups were able to bring a
change in the political discourse about women
and even conservative political parties were
forced to raise and include women’s political
representation in their manifestos. The
campaign against discriminatory laws had been
continuous and sustained for almost 25 years,
when they were eventually changed through the
Women’s Protection Bill in 2006.
Women activists also supported the government,
especially the Benazir Bhutto governments, in
outlining policy priorities for women. In this
connection, women activists facilitated Pakistan’s
international commitments and representation
at conferences and forums. In contrast to others,
activists did not produce an alternative to the
official report for the Beijing conference (1995),
as the official one was jointly owned by NGOs,
the women’s movement and the government.
The post-Beijing National Platform for Action
and its implementation through the National
Plan of Action were massive projects that were
executed by the government in collaboration
with representatives of the women’s movement,
who were also working with NGOs (Weiss 2001).
Thus, there was overall cooperation between the
government and the women’s movement at the
same time as points of difference and tension
between the two.
6 NGOs and women’s rights
The emergence of the NGO sector in 1980s’
Pakistan, in reaction to authoritarian rule and
unjust policies, is critiqued as a donor-funded
phenomenon. As many NGOs challenge the
status quo, they are accused of promoting foreign
agendas and the legitimacy of their work is often
questioned by conservative sections of state and
society on the basis of the foreign funding they
receive. This is especially the case with women’s
rights and equality issues, which question
cultural biases and anti-women interpretations
of religiously sanctioned laws.
Although a large number of NGOs are involved
with women’s rights work,4 as the prominent ones
are staffed by middle and upper middle class
women and men, they are seen to be disconnected
from the grassroots. Some of the influential
NGOs like Shirkat Gah, Aurat Foundation, ASR
(Applied Social Research) Institute, Simorgh,
Rozan and AGHS (Asma Jahangir, Gulrukh
Rehman, Hina Jilani and Shahla Zia) were
established by leading activists of the women’s
movement who are involved in research and
advocacy. They carved a space for themselves by
actively contributing to dialogues with the
government and serving on government
committees and Commissions that address
women’s issues. The activists in these NGOs have
therefore changed the shape of the policymaking
process in Pakistan by lobbying continuously for
women’s political, legal and economic rights: they
demanded 33 per cent political representation for
women at all levels of government; they insisted
on the repeal of discriminatory Hudood Laws;
they demanded an end to violence against women,
and a recognition of the economic contribution of
women in the government’s labour indices.5
As many women activists were involved in NGO
work, the role of NGOs and the women’s
movement became diluted as the two merged
into each other at different times and the
women’s movement became NGO-ised (Bari and
Khattak 2001). Given the cooperation between
the PPP government and NGOs in general, there
was trust at several levels; thus, the delegation to
Beijing included several leading NGO and
women’s rights activists. Several members of the
Commission on the Status of Women set up to
examine discriminatory laws in 1996 were
women’s rights activists. Different donor funded
projects for the government were initiated upon
the urging of leading women’s organisations. For
example, violence against women came to the
centre of media attention with the Zainab Noor
case in 1993 in which Zainab was severely
tortured, with damage to three vital organs, by
her prayer leader husband. While Zainab Noor
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was sent abroad at state expense for treatment,
the government set up burn centres and there
was renewed interest in improving crisis centres.
Voices from the women’s movement,
spearheaded by WAF, permeated the discourse of
the government, the donors and the NGOs as
many women activists ‘wore several hats’. They
were running their own organisations; they
sometimes took assignments with donors or
became consultants; at other times they served
in gratis capacity on government commissions
and authored government reports. One example
is Shahla Zia, widely respected for her stand on
women’s rights, who authored the excellent
baseline report on women in local government,
was one of the authors of the Women’s
Commission Report of 1997, wrote several Aurat
Foundation reports, headed the Legislative
Watch Group of Aurat Foundation and authored
reports for UNDP. Shahla was not an exception.6
What should be noted is that the voices of
women, while they were channelled through
different institutional prerogatives, were present
everywhere and helped make an impact far
greater than their numbers.
It was the consistent focus of the women’s
movement and like-minded NGOs that kept the
issues of discriminatory legislation and women’s
political representation in the public eye. Thus,
the announcement by Musharraf’s military regime
in 2000 that women would be granted 33 per cent
seats in LG came as a relief rather than a surprise.
Finally, after more than a decade of struggle for
political representation, women had gained the
space to exercise their political rights. There were
opportunities for women to prove themselves and
bring meaningful change into the system. The
credit for bringing women into the mainstream of
politics thus goes to women’s rights and human
rights activists as well as to the military regime
that was able to bypass political party interests and
institute affirmative action for women.
7 Conclusion
This article outlines the position of the major
stakeholders regarding women’s reserved seats:
military and civilian governments, donor agencies,
the women’s movement and women’s rights
NGOs. It is clear that different governments hold
widely varying positions and even institutions
within one government can hold and promote
diametrical views. It is important to understand
these nuances. The policies for promoting
women’s rights have been quite wide ranging – as
seen in the contrast between Zia-ul-Haq who
wanted women to stay behind the four walls while
granting them quotas and the Benazir Bhutto
governments that included women in decision-
making but failed to provide them with quotas.
The analysis of NGOs’ roles indicates that they
have mobilised women as voters and candidates
as well as provided capacity building training and
helped organise women councillors to form
networks. The strong voice of women’s rights
activists and the women’s movement is clear and
permeates through all three distinct and
different discourses from donors, the government
and NGOs on women’s political representation
experience in Pakistan. This reflects the shaping
of voice by institutions. While the women speak,
institutional frameworks are applied so that they
sound distinctly different even though the author
may be the same. Government reports reflect the
concerns of women nationally and internationally
but at the same time various in-built clauses such
as holding everything subordinate to a constantly
shifting definition of Sharia/Islam make these
reports palatable to the government; donor
reports are very careful about criticising the
government but they are ever-ready to blame
culture and tradition. NGO reports traverse the
uneasy path between donor conditions for
acceptability and policy impact and strong
feminist analyses.
I conclude that women’s struggles at the
grassroots can be successful and provide visible
results when women enjoy state as well as societal
support. Given that neither are straightforward
to obtain, the pathways to women’s political
empowerment are necessarily uneven and
unpredictable. Women have to negotiate for
spaces within patriarchal norms that often do not
allow them to make substantive gains or to
capitalise on them once the gains have been
allowed. Women’s struggles are thus complex and
take place in multiple contexts and settings. They
may succeed in one area and be pushed back in
another. However, the important point that
emerges is women’s persistent struggle against
odds through support from the same structures
that can impede them. How these struggles and
contradictions within masculinist structures are
negotiated, decides the terms and relative success
of women councillors at the individual level.
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Notes
* This is a shortened version of a paper by the
same author, published in Azim and Sultan
(2010).
1 President Musharraf resigned on 18 August
2008 and an acting president was appointed,
later replaced by President Asif Zardari.
However, no new policy has been announced
by the coalition government, therefore the
policy analysis here is restricted to the
initiatives of the Musharraf regime in
connection with LG as well as women.
2 According to the NRB (National
Reconstruction Bureau), the present system
of decentralisation is based on a model of 5Ds:
devolution of political power, distribution of
resources to the districts, diffusion of the
power authority nexus, decentralisation of
management functions and decentralisation
of administrative authority (Yazdani 2003).
3 This policy was available on the website of the
Ministry for Women’s Development until May
2008 but has been removed since after a
change in government. No new policy has
replaced it at the time of writing.
4 There are no reliable figures available about
the number of NGOs focusing on women’s
issues. A 2002 study by the SPDC (Social Policy
and Development Centre) places the total
number of non-profits at 45,000 in Pakistan,
with a majority focusing on education and
research (46.4 per cent), including religious
education and 17.5 per cent looking at civil
rights and advocacy issues.
5 For a good overview of the development of the
NGO sector and its relations with the state in
Pakistan, see Khan (2001).
6 Other examples are Farida Shaheed and
Khawar Mumtaz, authors of several
government reports and responsible for
Beijing Plus Five and Beijing Plus Ten through
Shirkat Gah; Ayesha Khan, independent
consultant, WAF member who authored the
report on the Pakistan government policies on
women for the UNDP; Farzana Bari, author of
several donor reports on women and political
representation as well as the acting director of
the Center for Women’s Studies; Nafisa Shah
who has been a women’s rights activist,
journalist, Nazim (chief elected local
government official) and has consulted for
UNDP; and Tahira Abdullah, an ardent
women’s rights activist, who has worked with
UNFPA and been a founding member of WAF.
The voices of these women and several others
like them have permeated different reports in
different forums organised by NGOs, the
government and donors.
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